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Freedom of communication and new technological
developments in the Federal Republic of Germany
WOLFGANG HOFFMANN-RIEM

I. Changes

in the

technological,

economic

and

political

reality

The development of communications in industrialized nations has been detennined by
a number of extra-legal factors, to which, however, the legal system must react and has in
fact reacted. One important factor is certainly the new production and transmission
technologies for mass communication-for
instance, the use.in many countries of
telecommunications and broadcasting satellites, copper and fibre-optic cables and, above
all, advances in micro electronics. In the field of terrestrial broadcasts, new frequencies
have been opened up; cables and satellites create new paths for broadcasts and new
transmission areas. Revolutionary changes in recording and playback technologies (e.g.,
VCR) increase mobility and reduce costs. Although these changes have not occurred in all
countries, they are everywhere on the verge of being introduced. Communications is an
expanding sector of the economy.
From an economic standpoint, the electronic media have been recognized as an
expanding economic sector into which both traditional media finns-such
as publishing
houses-and
companies outside the branch have been pushing their way. Supported by
new technological possibilities, large, even worldwide, markets are fonning for software
and hardware in the broadcasting sector. However, it is not only the large, multinational
or international undertakings that are seeking to take over these markets: A particularly
promising recipe for economic success appears to be offered by the various interlocked
media sectors, which permit one media field's know-how, technical and personnel
facilities, marketing organization and so on to be used by the others.
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the dynamics of the broadcasting market
exercise a stronger influence on development than statutory law is able to do. Reality
shows that law must give way or be modified when it obstructs the expansion of the
broadcasting
market. The trend toward deregulation is a logical consequence of
. commercialisation and internationalization.
The salient points of this development can be characterized as follows: In addition to
technological change, attention must be given to the commercialisation of broadcast
programming, the internationalization of media markets, the "multimedianess" of leading
corporate giants, economic concentration,
and a governmental policy of growing
deregulation.!

1.

On these trends, see Wolfgang
Hoffmann-Riem,
Internationale
Medienmarkte-Nationale
RundfunkordnUIIgen. AnmerkUIIgen zu EntwicklUIIgstendenzen
in Medienbereich, in 34 Rundfunk And
Femsehen
5-22 (1986); Jeremy Tunstall,
Communications
Deregulation-The
unleashing
of
America's
Communications
Industry (1986) (Oxford): Video Media Competition-Regulation,
Economics and Technology (ed. by Eli M. Noam 1985) (New York). Andre Lange & Jean-Luc
Renaud. The Future of the European Audio visual Industry (1989) (Manchester).
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The above-described
trends towards change are not neutral as to the content of
communication. In particular, the guise as well as the constitutional significance of mass
communications are changing. Thus far in Europe, mass media's functions in state and
cult'JI"al policies were principally emphasized, and its publici sed message was taken as the
reference point for the structuring of policy decisions, at least in the area of broadcasting.
But now, the publicizing dimension has taken a back seat to considerations of economics
and economic policy, which have been forcing their way into the forefront of efforts to
change the broadcasting structure.! These trends crop up not simply in the broadcasting
area; rather, they truly begin to emerge with the use of other new communications
technologies that traditionally have been subject to less regulation than the broadcasting
sector.
In addition to internationalization
and commercialisation
there are also other
developments,
such as attempts to localize media2 for the purpose of creating new
opportunities for non-professional communication - as can be seen, for instance, with
"public access" in radio or television.3 These do not, however, determine development but
rather serve as a supplement to a media system primarily aimed at larger markets, a
system based on the development of large trans border markets and large interlocked
multimedia systems.

II. The sphere of protection
the media

aff.orded by freedom of communications

and

Under these circumstances, it might appear anachronistic to reflect on national law.
Nevertheless, the development of communications markets will, for the time being also
continue to be influenced by national and international law insofar as these are able to be
influenced by law.
The communications and media sector has traditionally been influenced by law, even
though media law has only recently taken shape as an independent area of the law. The
media sector is, presently a particularly good subject for studying how economic,
technological,
political and social conditions act upon the legal system and how
traditional law is changing. Especially worthy of observation is West Germany's leg~lmedia system, which for years had resisted the privatisation of broadcasting but now is
aligning itself with the Europe-wide trend of deregulation. The West German media
.system has been predominantly developed by case law on freedom of communication. In
order to understand the development of the media and freedom of communication it is
necessary to study the basic legal conditions and comprehend the concept of basic rights,
especially that pertaining to freedom of communication.

I.

2.
3.

The initiatives of the European Commission are prototypical in this regard. See Commission of the
European Communities, Green Paper: Television without Frontiers. Green Paper on the Establishment
of a Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially for Satellite and Cable, of June 14, 1984, Eur.
Comm. Doc. Com. '(84) 300 final; Common Position of April 13, 1989 taken by the Council on a
Council directive on the coordination
of certain provisions
laid down by law, regulation on
administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of broadcasting activities (Television
Directive), Eur. Comm. Doc. Com. (88) 154 final, reproduced in Rundfunk and Fernsehen 324 (1989).
See also, e.g. Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker, in In Welcher Weise empfiehlt es sich, die Ordnung des
Rundfunks und sein Verhaltnis zu anderen Medien - auch under dem Gesichtspunkt der Harmonisierung
- zu regeln? Vol. 2 of the Standige Deputation Deutschen Juristentages, 09-037 (1986) (Munich).
Radio, 2
See the comparative analysis by Hans 1. Kleinstuber, el al., Lokales, nicht-kommerzielles
vols. (1988) (Hamburg).
See the review of literature and the substantive remarks in Ulrich Patzold, Der Offene Kanal im
Kabelpilotprojekt
Dortmund, vol 3 (1987) (research accompanying the Dortmund pilot cable project
by the State of North Rhein-Westphalia).
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information
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and the media

1. The state of the law in India and West Germany
The concept of freedom of communication is known throughout the world. As India
created its constitution some 40 years ago. it is also provided for fundamental rights,
picking up in the process on the notion of freedom found in the U.S. and English Bills of
Rights and in the French Revolution. Prior to 1950, such guarantees of liberty were
nonexistent in India,! although in the 1930s, there were corresponding political demands
for this. Freedom of communication was likewise introduced into West Germany's Basic
Law, which entered into force in 1949. Based on earlier ideals from the 19th century (in
particular, on the so-called S1. Paul's Church Constitution of 1848) and 20th century (the
Weimar Constitution of 1919), a number of traditional, political freedoms were given
constitutional protection; freedom of association and assembly, freedom of science and
education, and freedom of communicat~on.
Freedom of opinion and the press lies at the core of the concept of liberty in
democracies. In West Germany's Basic Law, this freedom is provided to individual
citizens, as well as to institutions of the press, film and broadcasting. It is recognized
today that all forms of mass media fall within the scope of this guarantee, including those
that are only now beginning to come to the fore on account of new technological
developments.
As is generally known; India's constitution lacks an express reference to the mass
media. At the same time, however, it is recognised that freedom of the press is covered by
freedom of expression.2 This situation is different for broadcasting. As was the case in the
German Reich, broadcasting has a relatively long tradition in India. In both countries, it
was developed with strong protection from the state, although in India it was initially the
responsibility of a private concern, the Indian Broadcasting Company. In the German
Reich, on the other hand, broadcasting from the outset came into being under the
supremacy of the Reich Postal Service.3 During the period of National Socialism (19331945), the Government exploited this situation in order to employ broadcasting for
massive propaganda purposes.
Following the War, a lesson was drawn from this abuse of broadcasting in Germany.
Just as with the press, broadcasting was to be independent of the state. The model for this
was the British BBC. The freedom of broadcasting set forth in West Germany's Basic Law
was intended to, and in fact does, protect this independence. A corresponding guarantee is
not to be found in the Indian Constitution; the exercise by the Government of influence
over broadcasting, which has been in effect since 1930, continues to be the rule in India.
In the following, I will not deal with the development of the freedom of opinion and
the media in India but rather with its significance in the Federal Republic of Germany. I
will only go into the state of the law in India in order better to illustrate similarities or
differences.

2. Free expression

of opinion

The constitutional anchor of the system of communications law in West Germany in
Article 5 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). This norm recognizes three different basic rights
of communication. In the first place, the expression and dissemination of opinions, i.e.,
the activities of the communicator, are protected. The term "opinion" covers not only
1.
2.
3.

See K.D. Gaur, Law of International Telecommunications in India, 78 (1988) (Baden-Baden).
See e.g., Sakal Newspapers lid v Union of India, 1972 AIR 305 (S.C).
The development of German broadcasting is chronicled in the intemationaIes Handbuch far Rundfunk
And Fernsehen 1988-98, at pp. B 1 ff. (ed. by Hans Bredow Institute 1988) (Baden-Baden).
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value judgments in the broadest sense but also statements of fact. Protected is the
transmission of information, regardless of whether this information originates in one's
own sphere or is simply passed on. The reach of the protection afforded by this basic right
is independent of the choice of form in which communication is expressed (word, writing,
picture, etc.) The state is not permitted to define expressions of opinion as valuable or
worthless or as important or meaningless and thereby to offer differing levels of
protection. Opinions and facts need not be related to "political subjects" or to affairs of
public significance. On the contrary, communicative development is broadly protected,
with all forms expression being covered: artistic, musical and even symbolic. Protection
is also not denied merely because the expresse-d opinion serves other purposes-e.g.,
commercial purposes-in
addition to the communicative purpose.! Thus, commercial and
other (for instance, political) advertisements are protected.2
3. Freedom

of reception

.as a part of freedom of information
The Federal Constitutional Court has emphasized that Article 5, of the Basic Law
protects the "process of communication", which covers not only the freedom to express
and disseminate opinions but also the "freedom to take note of expressed opinions, to
inform oneself'. 3 In only one respect, however, has freedom of reception been particularly
addressed-namely,
as the freedom to inform oneself without restriction from generally
accessible sources. The freedom to use a source available only to the recipient-for
instance, one accessible to a friend in a personal conversation-is
protected not by this
special form of freedom of information but rather as a necessary supplement to the general
freedom of opinion.
The reason why freedom of information values generally accessible sources so highly
is rooted in a lesson derived from history, e.g., the period of National Socialism, which
supported dictatorship in part by prohibiting the reception of such generally accessible
sources as foreign radio. The special protection afforded by freedom of information
presupposes that the source of the information is "generally accessible". This is usually
the case "when the source of the information is both technically suited and intended to
provide information to the general public i.e. to a circle of persons not specific as to
individuals. "4 Newspapers, radio and other forms of mass communications fall within this
definition. General accessibility can also be effectuated abroad: it suffices for the
applicability of freedom of information that the source is accessible at some location,
which can also lie outside the Federal Republic.
The right to inform oneself includes the right to use technical facilities, like
antennas, in order to receive information. Yet there is no constitutional obligation on the
state to establish technical facilities for the private reception of information. Under West
German law,S the Bundespost (West Germany's PTf) generally acts as the constructor

1.

2.

Entscheidungen
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
(Decisions of the Federal Constitutional
Court:
hereinafter,
BVerfGE) 30, 336, 352. See also Albrecht Hesse, Werbung and Rundfunkfreiheil.
Zeitschrift fur Urheber-und Medienrecht/Film und Recht 1987,548 with further references
For the press, see BVerfGE 21, 271, 278, ff.; BVerfGE 64, 108, 114. The matter was left open with
regard
to broadcasting
in BVerfGE
74, 297, 341, Contra
Entscheidungen
des
Bundesverwaltungsgerichts
(Decisions of the Federal Administrative Court: hereinafter. BVerfGE) 2,
172, 178. See also Gerhard Wacke, Werbeaussagen
als MeinungsauBerungen,
in Festschrift fur
Schack 197, 207 (1966); Peter Lerche. Werbung and Verfassung 76 ff. (1967; Fritz Drettmann,
Wirtshaftswerbung
and Meinungsfreiheit
93 ff. (1984).

3.

BVetfGE57,319.

4.
5.

BVerfGE 27, 83.
Of special relevance are the Act on Telecommunication
the version
published
on March
17, 1977
(Telekommunikalionsordnung.
).

Facilities (Geselz uber Femmeldeanlagen).
In
and the Telecommunications
Directive
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and operator of these cable systems. Consequently, it is legally obliged to act in an
impartial manner and to provide adequate opportunities to use the cable network for the
transmission of information.
For the recipient, the right to inform oneself without restriction by the state covers
the mere reception of information, as well as active procurement of information,
including the use of technical devices.l Since this only involves a defensive right vis-a-vis
the Government, freedom of information brings with it no claim that the state provide
sources of information. However other norms-such
as the constitutional principles of
rule by law (Rechtsstaat), social justice (Sozialstaat) and democracy-can
and do imply a
legal duty on governmental organs to ensure that adequate opportunities for information
are provided for.2 This may include measures against exclusive rights if they undermine
the right of the public to information.3

4. Media freedom
In addition to the freedom of opinion and reception, guarantees are in place for
"freedom of the press and freedom to report via broadcasting and film". This is the socalled media freedom, e.g., the freedom to publicize through a mass medium. Although
the term "mass communications" does not appear in the Constitution, it is implicitly
taken as the basis for the delimitation between freedom of opinion (in the sense of the
first sentence of Article 5(1) of the Basic Law) and the somewhat different media freedom
(in the sense of the second sentence of Article 5(1)). One can define mass communications
as follows: It is communication accessible to the general public or a part of it, whose
contents are distributed or disseminated by certain means of dissemination (e.g. printed
products, radio film exhibition) suited and destined for communication to the general
public or a part thereof.4 Institutions that produce or disseminate the contents of mass
communications are commonly referred to as "mass media."
Historically, the protection of the mass media flows from the maintenance of the
traditional basic right of freedom of the press. Freedom of broadcasting and of film were
included in the 20th century. The second sentence of Article 5(1) is understood in a broad
sense, such that new means of mass communications (e.g. television) are also brought
within its sphere of protection; this includes the use of new broadcasting technologies,
such as cable and satellite broadcasting.

B. Subjective

and objective

substance

of basic rights

In dealing with the freedoms of communication, it is extremely important to take
into account their foundation under basic-rights theory. Article 5 of the Basic Law is a
part of the liberal tradition surrounding basic rights in Western Europe, protecting free
communicative
activity from interference by the state (a basic right's "defensive"
character). Any individual may use his subjective basic right to oppose state action. It is
sometimes even held that a defensive right is also to be employed against nongovernmental agencies of power that are able to impair basic rights in a state-like
1.
2.

3.
4.

BVerfGE 27, 82.
This issue was left open by the Federal Administrative Court, Die Offentliche Verwaltung 1979, 102.
See also yon logo yon Munch, Grundgestez, Randnummer 20 on Article 5 (3d ed. 1985) (Munich);
Hans D Jarass, Nachrichtensperre and Grundgesetz - Die Offentlichk.eit als Verjassungsdirektive,
Archiv fur Presserecht 1979, 228, 230-31.
See BVerfGE 70, 310, 312 with a comment by Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem. Juristenzeitung 1985,
627-28.
On attempts to define this, see Hans D. Jarass, Die Freiheit der Massenmedien 29 ff. (1978) (BadenBaden), with further references; Joachirne Scherer, Teletextsyteme And Prozedurale Rundfunkfreiheit,
Der Staat 1983, 354 ff; Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Altemativkommentar zum Grundgesetz,
Randnummer 119 (2d ed. 1989) (Neuwied).
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manner.

I

The subjective-or individualized-element of basic rights is accompanied by another,
generally termed "objective". This means that a basic right operates as an objective
(directive) principle of the legal system in interpreting other norms. Therefore, the basic
right can indirectly exert influence on the interpretation of all norms, including when they
directly relate to communication. The state is at the same time under a programmatic duty
(a constitutional directive) to establish a sound and well-functioning system with regard to
communications that is free and democratic, such that every person is provided with the
opportunity to form freely an individual opinion and contribute to the formation of public
opinion. The Government
is thus to facilitate the formation of opinion "in a
comprehensive sense, which is not limited to the mere reporting or news or conveyance
of political opinions but rather covering every conveyance of information and opinion."2
Of particular importance is the protection of the functioning of the media system in all
areas of life-for
instance, with regard to information not simply in "developments in
Government" or "cUI':!'entaffairs" but also on "development in sociallife."3
In order to ensure the process of communication in a comprehensive sense, the
freedom from state domination and interference alone does not suffice. For this reason, the
Federal Constitutional Court has required, at least for the area of broadcasting, the creation
of a "positive regulatory framework. "4 which guarantees the plurality and independence of
broadcasting. Furthermore, the state's duty to establish this sort of system is also
determined by provisions regarding constitutional goals that flow from the principles of
democracy, the rule of law and social justice. As a result, the sphere of state duties also
includes seeing to it that the necessary legal and other (economic, social, cultural etc.)
conditions are present for the exercise of the basic freedom.s Although the state is not
obligated to provide for comprehensive communications,
it must ensure that the
formation of free, individual opinion and public opinion with the aid of the mass media is
not only theoretically but also actually possible.

C. The establishment

of limitations

versus

structuring

The objective substance of the basic right is a remarkable construct, which has a
lasting effect on the interpretation of Article 5 of the Basic Law-for both individual and
mass communications. The exercise of freedom of communication and information is
subject to special provisions, which will be treated in the following. Two different types
must be distinguished: special limitations on freedom of communication, on the one
hand, and the structuring of the communications order, on the other.

1.

Limitations

on freedom

of communication

Article 5(2) of the Basic Law establishes special limitations on freedom of
communication,
which act in a negative fashion to safeguard other objects of legal
protection that may be in conflict with it. These objects serve interests other than the
facilitation of freedom of communication-such
as protection of personality, copyright
and young persons-that
might be iwpaired by cOIIlmunicative activity. Similar
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See Konrad Hesse, Grundzuge des Verfassungsrechts in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Randnummer
357 (16th ed. 1988) (Heidelberg), with reference to BVerfGE 25, 256, 263-64; BVerfGE 62, 230 24445.
BVerfGE 57, 319 with reference to among others, BVerfGE 12205260.
See e.g. BVerfGE 35, 222; BVerfGE 59, 258. For example, the area of entertainment by the mass
media also falls within lhe scope of protection.
BVerfGE 57, 320. See also BVerfGE 73, 118, 152-53; for the areas of the press, see BVerfGE 20,
162, 176.
,See generally Konard Hesse Bes/and and Bedeunung der Grundrech/e in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland. Europaische Grundrechte Zeitschrift, 1978,443.
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German Basic Law is somewhat more restrained than the Indian constitution as is
particularly shown by the amendments to the Indian Constitution in 1951 and 1963. In
West Germany, it is basically forbidden that the freedom of opinion and the media can be
limited in order to achieve, for instance, such goals as friendly relations with foreign
states or public order (understood as public peace, safety and tranquillity). The risk is
considered to be too great that the state might take such objects of legal protection which
of necessity are defined broadly, as a pretext for suppressing the freedom of opinion and
the media. It is, however, in all respects permissible also to protect in exceptional cases
such objects as the functioning of the state or the reputation of its representatives,
although in the later case, protection does not extend to pointed, unsparing attacks but
rather onl y to massive defamation or vilification.l
The Basic Law does not expressly list the permissible limitations on the freedom of
communication, referring instead to "general laws" (allgemeine Gesetze) as limits. The
Federal Constitutional Court has taken this to mean laws that do not per se forbid an
opinion or the expression of an opinion: rather, the court reads the Basic Law as having
intended laws that serve to protect an object to be safeguarded in any event, regardless of
communication or a given opinion, i.e., the protection of a community value that takes
precedence to the exercise of freedom of expression.2 Laws directed against communication
as such or a certain opinion are in this sense no longer "generallaws".3 A general law
must serve a legitimate purpose, i.e, aim at warding off dangers to an object of legal
protection when such protection takes precedence to the freedom of communication.
Furthermore, the manner in which protection is undertaken must be legitimate. This
means above all that in protecting this object, the impairment of the freedom of
communication must be reasonable, appropriate and necessary.4 Objects that have been
recognized as meriting protection include that of young persons and of personal dignity.
In particular, it is not permitted to offend someone by way of false allegation or
defamatory opinion. Also warranting protection is the functioning of governmental
organs. Nevertheless, when the Government, its officials or its policy is criticized, this
never gives rise to a case for protection. Nor even the "esteem of the state" as such is an
object of protection. Only when the functioning of the state is endangered can the
expression of an opinion be enjoined, if at all.
Even though it is, in principle, recognized that the freedom of opinion and the media
may be restricted in order to protect a certain object, it must nevertheless further be
examined whether sufficient consideration has actually been given to the lofty status of
freedom of communication.
It should be determined in the course of a balancing of legal merits whether in a
concrete instance the interest in communication or that in protection is predominant-or
whether it is possible to arrive at a "gentle compromise", such that both interests are
taken into account (the so-called practical concordance).5 To this extent, one must
scrutinize closely which particular object is promoted by the general law and whether this
is to take precedence to the protection of the freedom of communication. It is furthermore
examined by the court whether the impairment of freedom of communication
is
reasonable, appropriate and necessary in order to respect the other object to be protected.6
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

For case law, cr. K.E.Wenzel, Das Rechl der Wort-und Bildberichterstauung 126-127, 158 (3d ed.
1986).
BVerfGE 7, 198,209-10, BVerfGE 62, 230 243-44.
See BVerfGE 7, 198,209-10.
See BVerfGE 59, 231, 265 BVerfGE 71, 162, 181: BVerfGE 71, 206,214,
The term comes from Hesse, supra note 17 at Randnurnrner 317 ff.
BVerfGE 59, 231,265: BVerfGE 71,162,181: BVerfGE 71 206 214.
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This is similar to the requirement of reasonableness under Indian law. However, the
West German Federal Constitutional Court strives to apply the standards strictly: in cases
of doubt, the freedom of communication takes precedence. The basic concept is that the
freedom of opinion is one of a democracy's most highly protected rights and that a
democracy must also be able to tolerate sharp differences of opinion.
Article 5(1), third sentence, of the Basic Law forbids censorship, although this is
limited to pre-censorship. This is to prevent the systematic supervision and conscription
of communication processes. In this manner, the intimidation of citizens is also to be
avoided. It is, however, possible to impose sanctions subsequently-i.e.,
following
expression of an opinion-when,
for example, a violation of the law has occurred.

2. Structuring

of the communications

order

One must distinguish
between the establishment
of these limitations
on
communications, on the one hand, and the structuring of the overall communications
order, on the other. The latt~r involves positive guarantees by the state to ensure the
functioning of the communications
order, in particular, those that enable the free
formation of opinion. To this extent, one might speak-in the terminology fQund in the
Indian constitution-of "directive principles of the state policy."l The legal power to create
a positive order does not run so far in the Federal Republic as to bring, for example,
broadcasting under the control of the Government. On the contrary, the state must ensure
that broadcasting remains independent, especially vis-a-vis the state. The high rank of the
communications order in the entire legal order is to be secured-e.g.
also in the civil law,
which regulates the legal relationships among citizens (a so-called indirect side effect of
basic rights).2 The communications order is also to be protected against the unilateral use
of power, especially the unilateral exercise of influence by private parties, for instance,
powerful conglomerates.3
The protection of the communications order is the point of departure above all for
legislation on broadcasting. By way of substantive, organizational and procedural rules, it
is particularly to be ensured that the "the variety of existing opinion finds expression in a
spectrum and with a degree of completeness as great as possible and that comprehensive
information is offered in this fashion."4 The connection between broadcasting and
formation of public opinion in all areas of life is for this concept the occasion to subject
public and private broadcasting to special public-service
obligations (see infra section
III(B).
The right and obligation to structure the mass-media system is also the basis for
regulations on the retransmission of broadcasting signals in cable networks. According to
the Federal Constitutional Court,S the state is also obligated as regard re-transmission to
establish certain minimum conditions and to provide for their supervision. Especially
indispensable are basic principles that "guarantee a minimum of substantive balance,
objectivity and mutual respect."6

D. Parallels

to other

legal systems

The distinction
between the setting of limits and the structuring
of the
communications order can also be found in other Western European legal systems.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Arts 36 ff. of the Constitution of India.
See BVerfGE 7, 198205-06; BVerfGE 66, 116,135-36.
See BVerfGE 20, 162, 176; BVerfGE 25, 256, 264 ff.
BVerfGE 57, 320.
BVerfGE 73, 196.
Ibid at 199.
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However, it is apparently nowhere so accentuated as in the case law of the West Gennan
Federal Constitutional Court. This distinction can be recognised in the special media
legislation of other countries on, in particular, broadcasting. For example, in France,
Great Britain, Austria and the Netherlands, the traditional system of public broadcasting is
not to be solely construed as a setting of limits in the interest of safeguarding those
objects not relating to communications. On the contrary, these laws primarily seek to
ensure the functioning of the broadcasting order, for instance, the orientation toward
broadcasting's function as trustee of society or the maintenance of a balance between
various political forces.
In the European Human Rights Convention (EHRC) - which in West Gennany has
(only) the rank of statutory law! - this distinction is also manifested. West Gennany's
Federal Constitutional Court has not yet ruled on the interpretation of Article 10 of the
EHRC. In my opinion, there is a clear structural parallel between Article 5 of the Basic
Law and Article 10 of the EHRC ..
III.

Structuring

A. Private
videotex

of the communications

forms

of

financing

and

order
organization

for

press,

film

and

The West Gennan Federal Constitutional Court has emphasized that the legislature is
endowed with large discretion as regards set-up when it seeks to regulate the system of
mass communications. Responsible for this are the legislatures of West GennanY'~.)leven
states. However, the federal legislature is able to establish basic structures for the press
and film by way of so-called framework legislation (Article 75 of the Basic Law),
although it has thus far not done so. The state legislatures have placed the various mass
media under differing orders.
In the absence of contrary rules, the principle of freedom of establishment and
perfonnance applies for the press, cinema fIlm, videotex and the rental and distribution of
video.2 There is no licensing procedure in place, and any individual is free to establish aIJ.d
operate such a media undertaking. One is also free with regard to the fonn of organization
and financing. In this manner, press companies and agencies are organized as private
enterprises under private law, as are studios, distributors and other companies for the
production of film and video. The same goes for audio companies and suppliers of
videotex services. The latter might, however, subsequently be prohibited from offering
their services when they violate certain duties (see e.g. Article 12(3) of the Treaty on
Videotex).
At least for the press, it is disputed in legal literature whether fonns of private
enterprise are, with regard to organization and financing, irrevocably guaranteed under
constitutional
law.3 Although the Federal Constitutional Court has not yet had the
opportunity to rule on this, it has treated the private-enterprise structure of the press as a
foregone conclusion,4 thus indicating that this structure does not present a problem under
present conditions. At the same time the court has shown concern regarding the degree of
concentrationS and has long held that the state is oblige\l where necessary to ward off

1.
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Hesse, supra note 21. at Randnurnrner 278.
For the press, see BVerfGE 20, 174 ff.
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Pro: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Ktein & Christian Starck, Grundgesetz, vol 1. Randnummer 38
ff. 45, 58 on Article 5(1), (2) (1985) (Munich); Contra Wolfgang Hoffrnann-Riern, MassefIrMdien,

4.
5.
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dangers that might arise for a free press from the creation of monopolies on opinion.l
The same undoubtedIy goes for other media-including the so-called "new" media-that
operate along the principles of private enterprise. As long as their publicizing "power" is
more limited than that of the press and broadcasting the courts will likely be more
tolerant with respect of processes of concentration. The requirements regarding the type of
organization depend on the role a given mass medium plays in the process of the
formation of public opinion. The potential danger emanating from film and video, for
example, is seen as relatively insignificant such that they are not subject to special rules
on structure and organization.
It is to be assumed that the principle of private-entrepreneurial
freedom of
establishment also applies to the emerging possibilities for communication-provided,
however, that the legislature has not established special rules. For example, some state
legislatures have anticipated the introduction of so-called quasi-broadcasting services. i.e.
services that are in the nature of mass communications but that are not classified as
broadcasting. For these, special supervisory and, occasionally, licensing procedures have
been provided for2 or reserved.3 The legislature has in mind here special text-retrieval
services or the automatized individual requesting of music pieces or films from audio or
video libraries.'
B. Regulation

or private

broadcasting

Particularly extensive rules apply to the operation of broadcasting and to the
retransmission of broadcast programming. These will be discussed in detail in the
following.
1. Retransmission

or broadcasts

l'ia cable

The retransmission of broadcasts over cable is subject to broadcasting laws, which
however provide for less stringent commiunents than for the operation of broadcasting
itself. The rules all apply the principles that simultaneous and unaltered retransmission
presents no legal problem as long as the programs are able to be received in the respective
areas with an ordinary antenna. When programming from one West German state is
introduced into another by way of special retransmission facilities, it generally suffices
that the original broadcast was legally permissible in the originating state.~ Programming
introd':lced from abroad requires permission for retransmission in several states, which
may not, however, be refused for reasons of transmission content.6
West German cable systems have a transmission capacity of 24, sometimes 35,
television programs older systems, less. When these capacities are insufficient, then
decisions as to priority are inevitable. The relevant laws often provide that majority
decisions by the cable subscribers are to be taken into consideration.7 In making priority
decisions, programming originating in EC member states is not to be treated less
favourably than domestic programming, although German-language
programming
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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BVerfGE 20, 176.
See e.g., the State Media Law of Baden-WurUemberg, §§ 33 ff.
See e.g. the Media Law of the State of Hamburg, § 1 para, 2.
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anic1e II.
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receives preference. The federal Constitutional Court has not yet had the opportunity to
rule on the details of retransmission.

2. Licensing

of broadcasters

The courts have thus far often been faced with the issue of whether a broadcaster has a
legal claim to a licence. On the one hand, this is a basic question of constitutional law;
on the other, it is an issue of the application of the respective media laws. Up to now, the
Federal Constitutional Court has left the matter open, but it has held that a legal basis is
necessary for the licensing of broadcasters. 1 Thus, a legal claim has only been recognised
pursuant to the broadcasting laws. This leads to the rejection of a claim to licensing
stemming directly from the Constitution.

3. Rules regarding

the operation

of broadcasting

In West Germany, intensive debate - both politically and legally-has
surrounded
the issue of the requirements that laws must provide for the operation of private
broadcasting, including the retransmission of programming. In several decisions, the
Federal Constitutional Court has given these requirements more definite shape, and the
state legislatures have had to acquiesce in them.
The court has always assumed that the special situation of broadcasting, which is
characterized by scarcity of frequency and great financial expenditure, is one-but by no
means, the only-justification
for the fact that freedom of broadcasting must be specially
guaranteed by substantive, organizational and procedural rules.2 Competition alone, said
the court, does not adequately ensure that all, or least most, social groups and intellectual
movements actually have their say. Above all allowance had to be made for both the
possibilities of a concentration of power over opinion and the danger of the abuse
stemming from the one-sided exercising of influence on public opinion. Therefore, the
court has held that guarantees must be established to ensure that the spectrum of domestic
programming actually corresponds in essence to the existing variety of opinion; it must
be prevented that individual holders of opinion in possession of transmission facilities and
the requisite financial means dominate the formation of public opinion.3
In the so-talled Fourth Broadcasting Decision in 1986, however, the court once again
strongly focused on the frequency situation, stating though that the state of shortage had
not yet been overcome.4 The court also referred to the increasing Europeanization and
internationalization
of the broadcasting
market,S apparently as an indication that
regulations at the national level have at best only limited effectiveness.
The court was highly scepticat of the possibility that the public-service duty is
reasonably able to be fulfilled in a private broadcasting market. It cannot be expected that
private broadcasters will offer a wide spectrum of programming,
since they are virtually exclusively dependent on revenues from advertising for the
financing of their operations. These revenue will flow in all the more lucratively
when private programming achieves sufficiently high ratings. The suppliers of such
programming are thus faced with the ~onomic necessity or offering programs with
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2.
3.
4.
5.

BVerfGE 57, 320-21 see also BVerfGe, Neue Zeitschrift fur Verwaltungsrecht
1986, 379, 380;
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the highest possible mass appeal-which
is accomplished
by successfully
maximizing viewer and listener shares-at the lowest possible costs.

Programs that are of interest to only a limited number of viewers or listeners will at best
only be limitedly available, "although it is by way of such that the entire spectrum of
comprehensive information is to be attained."!
The court was forced to capitulate to the reality of the situation. Wishing to respect
the political desire for the introduction of private broadcasting, which was being expressed
in the political sphere with increasing intensity, it reduced the requirements that it had
earlier formulated for broadcasting. The court does not totally exempt private broadcasting
from. commitments, but it has lessened them to a degree that provides it with the chance
to develop. The court no longer demands the maintenance of comprehensive variety but
rather makes do with a "basic standard of balanced variety", which covers only the
"essential" requirements of variety of opinion.2 This holding also eases the legal
requirements on the retransmission of broadcasting signals.
In order to compensate for this moderation, the court has attempted to stabilize the
system of public broadcasting, which has been caught up in distress, and thus to preserve
for listeners and viewers the alternative of traditional public-service broadcasting. The
long-term maintenance of public broadcasting is achieved, among others, by accepting
relaxed conditions of existence for private broadcasting only with the prerequisite that the
activities of public broadcaster, set up along the lines of the traditional normative
requirements,
remain intact.3 In characterising the inalienable position of public
broadcasting, the court has used the term "basic provision" (Grundversorgung).
Public
broadcasting is charged with ensuring not only that the entirety of the population is
offered programming that provides comprehensive information within the overall
spectrum of the traditional broadcasting duty but also that the variety of opinion is
maintained. The programming that public broadcasting remains obligated to offer must
cover all branches of broadcasting, serve the process of forming public and political
opinion, contain information going beyond entertainment and running news coverage, and
observe the cultural responsibility of broadcasting. Basic provision means full provision
of broadcasting, not simply "minimum provision."4 The court is seeking to ensure that
public broadcasting remains able to exercise its essential functions even under conditions
ofa pan-European broadcasting market. This means that it be given a guarantee of
development.
Thus, basic provision must be maintained in technology, such that
reception by all is possible. Financing as well must be adequately ensured. 5
The transition to a dual broadcasting organization is, with regard to private
broadcasting, associated with a number of requirements. Only in the exceptional case are
these limitation rules in the sense of Article 5(2) of the Basic Law; generally, they go to
structure under Article 5(1). Such rules on structuring can be effected with various types
of regulation. I term them, on the one hand, imperative guidance and control and, on the
other, structural constraints. Imperative guidance and control refers to requirements and
prohibitions as well as sanctions, regarding conduct. Structural constraints instead create
framework data, in particular, those of an organizational or procedural variety. These
include the decision for or against the market model, requirements as to the pluralistic
composition of programming advisory committees or supervisory authorities. etc. Both
types are employed on West Germany's media landscape. I will not deal with them in
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

[bid at 155-56.
[bid at 160.
Ibid at 157 ff.; BVerfGE 74, 325 ff.
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detail, treating instead two important fields of regulation.

a. Battling concentration
When broadcasting is conducted by private companies, this usually results very
quickly-as
can be observed throughout the world-in
a state of concentration. Large
media companies thereby become influential mass communicators. This is particularly to
be seen in the U.S., the most recent example being the August 1989 merger between
Time Inc. and Warner Communications.
West Germany as well has large media
undertakings. such as the Bertelsmann Group, which was the world's largest media
syndicate prior to the above-mentioned creation of the U.S. media giant. West Germany
also has an influential press undertaking with the Springer Publishing Company and a
film dealer, Leo Kirch, who controls nearly the entire market for the provision of
broadcasters with cinema films and television series. Due to such concentration processes,
the risk of unilateral power over opinion arises. The state is called upon to use its laws to
ensure that large media companies do not endanger the variety of opinion and the freedom
of communication. Therefore, structural precautions have been set up; these include
measures to protect against the "dominating power over opinion. "1 The Constitutional
Court does not assume that market forces alone are able to afford such protection, making
additional legal rules necessary. Rules of economic law-especially,
anti trust law-are a
possible starting point, although in no way in and of themselves sufficient.2 It is
commonly necessary to provide additionally for special rules in broadcasting law. These
chiefly include precautions against cross-and
multiple ownership, in particular, crossownership between the press and broadcasting.3 When such rules are insufficient for
ensuring a widely varied supply and for preventing one-sided power over opinion, then
supplementary precautions are necessarywhich must extend all the farther, when
broadcasting is all the more removed from a structure that generates a guarantee of
plurality. Possible guarantees include, in the court's view, an undertaking in which
provider associations hold shares (Anbietergemeinschaft)-intemally
organized along
pluralistic lines-as
broadcaster4 or, for individual providers, the establishment of
pluralistic advisory committees that are able to exercise influence'on programming.s
West German legislation has often provided for several-though
weak-rules
for
limiting
cross-and
multiple ownership,6 and it has commonly seen to it that
Anbietergemeinschaften are given preferential treatment when it comes to licensing. With
regard to the battling of concentration, it is, however, to be noted that legal precautions
have not been able to prevent various sorts of multimedia combinations. In particular,
publishing companies' have persistently managed to establish themselves in the area of
broadcasting.8 Companies having nothing to do with the media have as well been able to
force their way into the new market. The possibility of treating and exploiting broadcast
programming as an economic commodity has enticed undertakings from a variety of
sectors. Access to the market was easiest for those firms that brought their own financing
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On the necessity of this protection, see BVerfGE 73. 160 172 ff.
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with them, with their being able to use economies of scale and to develop interlocked
multimedia and international systems. One can presently observe the development of
networks as well as special undertakings that supply programming.1 Foreign companies
are also increasingly beginning to enter the West German broadcasting market after
having initially been deterred by the complicated, fragmented media law in this country.

b.

Content

commitments

The Federal Constitutional Court assumed that from the aspect of programming as
well, the power of the market to control itself is not adequate for taking into account
broadcasting's public-service obligation. The necessary "substantive" rules of broadcasting
law go far beyond the scope of the proposed EC Television Directive.2 They include
duties of truth, care, fairness and protection, e.g., that of young persons, in some cases
also the duty of pluralistic variety.3 These rules must be neutral with respect to content.
Quota rules, which are to be introduced by the EC Directive, have thus far found little
resonance in the West German legislatures. Only in exceptional cases can one find loosely
formulated expectations with regard to programming of national or EC production.4
However, all laws contain rules on the modalities of financing, especially regarding
advertising. Although private broadcasters are given discretion in choosing their source of
financing, the especially important advertising financing is bound up with restrictions. A
certain degree of unification-and,
at the same time, mitigation-in
the requirements was
achieved by Article 7 of the West Germany Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting
(Rundfunkstaatsvertrag).
Some of these provisions will have to be amended in order to
adhere to the EC Directive-for
instance, the rule on the maximum amounts of
advertising time (currently 20% of the daily transmission time). Other rules contain the
precept of separation of advertising from the rest of broadcast programming,
the
requirement of identifying advertising and the prohibition on advertisers exercising
influence on the contents of programming. Sponsoring is also subject to certain, though
vague, limitations for instance, the prohibition (which is nearly impossible to supervise)
on any direct connection between the program sponsored and the economic interests of the
sponsor; In directives of the directors of the states media conference, these rules have been
more narrowly specified, although at the same time in a relatively loose fashion.5

c. Supervision

of broadcasting

As experience demonstrates,6 it is difficult to seek to influence the conduct of
broadcaster with the aid of structural and/or content-related rules. The broadcasters
generally resist such rules when they touch upon their publicizing and economic freedom
to develop, and they fmd ways to get around them.7 The Federal Constitutional Court has
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held that the Basic Law requires effective supervision of the broadcasting obligations.l For
this reason, special authorities have been set up to supervise programming commitments
as well as structural constraints; these authorities are at the same time responsible for
licensing broadcasters and for supervising the retransmission of broadcasts via cable.
In West Germany, the supervisory authorities are not tied to any state2 and are
usually-although
this is not necessary-set
up according to the pluralistic model. The
main organ is a generally large, collegial body in which various political and social forces
are represented.3 The authorities have the right to raise objections, to impart directives and
to revoke licences.4 In keeping with practice,5 the Federal Constitutional Court assumes
that initially informal possibilities are employed, such as discussions and correspondence,
and that these instruments of the policy of "raised eyebrows" are effective.6 Should official
powers prove to be inadequately effective, the legislature is obligated to improve them.'
Practice shows that the supervisory authorities have substantial difficulties with effective
supervision, and despite intensive supervision, they tend to interpret legal requirements
somewhat reservedly. This reduces possible conflicts.8 There are nowhere any indications
that the legislature has used the empirical limits on the effectiveness of supervision as the
occasion to reform the set of legal instruments.
IV. Conclusion
The problems that I have described, as well as the paths to resolve them, ,are typical
for a country with high economic prosperity and a well-developed media system with
competing broadcasters and press companies. I am well aware of the fact that India has. in
part, entirely different problems facing it. Particularly in the area of broadcasting, a
different concept is pursued in India. This is justified by reference to broadcasting's
important function in the development of society. In a book authored by an Indian, the
following objectives were listed as being decisive for broadcasting activities:
to act as a catalyst for social change;
to promote national integration;
to stimulate a scientific temper in the minds of the people;
(Q disseminate the message of family planning as a means of population control
and family welfare;

to provide essential information and knowledge in order to stimulate greater
agricultural production;
to promote, and help preserve, an environmental and ecological balance;
to highlight the need for social welfare measures, particularly
welfare of women, children and the less-privileged;
to promote interest in games and sports; and

those for the

to create artistic and cultural heritage values.9
Although such objectives are commendable, the question still remains as to how far
broadcasting can contribute to their fulfilment and how large the risk is that politicians
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use such objectives as a pretext for bringing broadcasting under their control in order to
pursue entirely different objectives, such as keeping themselves in political power.
Broadcasting in the Federal Republic is placed under a number of obligations by law.
For example, the North German Broadcasting Association (Norddeutsche Rundfunk;
NDR) is legally obligated "to provide all broadcasting recipients with an objective,
comprehensive overview of international, national and state events in all essential areas of
life. Its programming is to serve to inform, educate, advise and entertain".1 Furthermore,
"NDR must respect human dignity in its programming. It is to assist in strengthening
the respect for life, liberty and freedom from bodily harm as well as for the beliefs and
opinions of others NDR's programming is to promote international understanding, to
advocate peace and the unity of Germany in peace and justice, and to call for social
justice. The moral and religious convictions of the population are to be respected."2
Representatives of vatious societal groups use their influence on supervisory boards in the
broadcasting corporations in order to see to it that these objectives are adhered to. This
applies, however, only for public broadcasting; private (commercial) broadcasting is
subject to considerably weaker commitments.
It can nevertheless be stated for all broadcasters that the expectations that society can
be positively influenced are substantially lower than, for instance, in India. A
contributing factor for this may be that it is even disputed among scientists as to the
extent to which broadcasting is able to make a positive contribution to the development
of society. Moreover, there is a significant fear that broadcasting can be abused by
politicians. With respect to commercial broadcasting, accepting the duty to promote the
objectives of societal development is inconsistent with its basic, economic orientation.
When broadcasting becomes an economic good, then decisive for the broadcaster is how
this good can best be brought to the market and achieve this greatest possible economic
returns. It is my guess that India will also be able to make this observation if the plans
for the establishment of a commercial broadcasting channel are carried through.
It goes without saying that every country is ultimately itself responsible for the
development of its broadcasting order. There are no patent formulae that promise success
in the same fashion throughout the world. Nevertheless. I believe that it is important for
every country to have its own answer on hand for the question of what its broadcasting
order is to look like and what can be expected of broadcasting.The Federal Republic has
decided to allow broadcasting to develop as independently as possible. West Germany is a
wealthy country, where most people are able, for example, to afford at least some of the
products that are extolled in radio or television advertising. Nonetheless, many are
troubled by the fact that broadcasting in the Federal Republic is treated less and less as a
cultural asset and is primarily becoming an economic asset.
The commercialisation of broadcasting will in all likelihood have a lasting effect on
society's value system. International experience demonstrates that in the process, a
commercial broadcasting system contributes to broadcasting being used principally as an
entertainment
medium. The tried and true concept-communication
is of special
significance for the formation of political opinion-thereby
recedes into the background.
But it is of course just as legitimate to\ provide for the entertainment of citizens, in
particular, for as high a quality as possible. In my opinion, it would be most regrettable
if the democratic function of mass communication were thereby to be lost from sight.
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